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Abstract 
Does past performance influence success in grant applications? In this study we test 
whether the grant allocation decisions of the Netherlands Research Council for the 
Economic and Social Sciences correlate with the past performances of the applicants 
in terms of publications and citations, and with the results of the peer review process 
organized by the Council. We show that the Council is successful in distinguishing 
grant applicants with above-average performance from those with below-average 
performance, but within the former group no correlation could be found between past 
performance and receiving a grant. When comparing the best performing researchers 
who were denied funding with the group of researchers who received it, the rejected 
researchers significantly outperformed the funded ones. Furthermore, the best rejected 
proposals score on average as high on the outcomes of the peer review process as the 
accepted proposals. Finally, we found that the Council under study successfully 
corrected for gender effects during the selection process. We explain why these 
findings may be more general than for this case only. However, if research councils are 
not able to select the ‘best’ researchers, perhaps they should reconsider their mission. 
In a final section with policy implications, we discuss the role of research councils at the 
level of the science system in terms of variation, innovation, and quality control.  
 
1. Introduction 
Research councils organize selection processes based on a variety of grant proposals. 
This variety is generated by creative researchers who translate new ideas into project 
proposals for which they try to secure funding. The aim of the councils is generally to 
select the “best” and most innovative proposals and researchers. In this report we 
address the question of how this process of variation (by the researchers) and 
selection (by the research councils) works: are research councils in a position to select 
the “best” proposals of the “best” researchers for funding? Is a council able to “pick the 
winners” on the basis of reviews? (Martin & Irvine, 1984). 
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This study is based on an analysis in collaboration with the Netherlands Economic and 
Social Science Research Council (MAGW-NWO). We were invited to evaluate their 
existing system of peer-review-based grant allocations. Would a scientometric 
evaluation of the proposals validate the results of their selection process? Can 
systematic differences between the two methods of evaluation be explained? How 
might this comparison change one’s assessment of the value of both evaluation 
techniques in the social sciences?  
Our primary research question focuses on the relationship between the past 
performance of researchers and the allocation decisions of the Research Council: does 
the money flow to the top researchers according to their past performance? Our 
second question addresses the relationship between the peer review system used by 
this Council and the decisions made by it: are the most highly rated proposals 
rewarded? As a third question, we focus on the relationship between the peer review 
reports and the past performance scores of the applicants.  
Both peer review and the bibliometric assessment of performance have often been 
discussed and researched, and the two methods are often contrasted (Aksnes & Taxt 
2004; Butler 2007, 2008; Charlton & Andras 2007; Donovan 2007; Moed 2007; 
Nightingale & Scott 2007). Peer review occurs in the context of journals selecting 
papers for publication as well as grant allocations. Reviewers are known to be 
inconsistent in their assessments of proposals and papers (e.g., Rothwell & Martyn 
2000). The debate about peer review was triggered by an experiment in which already 
published papers were resubmitted, but with fake names and low-status universities as 
addresses. The resubmitted papers were mostly rejected, and only in a few cases did 
the reviewers recognize them as previously published (Peters & Ceci 1982). Some 
authors argue that results of this nature show that peer review is not an adequate 
selection process. Scientists, however, consider peer review as a necessity in an open 
research environment. From a discursive perspective, disagreement between 
assessments by referees can even be appreciated positively (Hirschhauer 2004).  
Furthermore, specific problems may originate from the method of peer review itself. 
Some researchers observed a strong gender bias and nepotism in peer review 
(Wenneras & Wold, 1995), although others were not able to replicate this bias in more 
recent years (Sandstrom & Hällsten 2005). In a meta-analysis, Bornmann et al. (2008b) 
confirmed the continuing existence of a gender bias, but this bias seems to be 
diminishing. Nepotism, on the other hand, has remained an issue (Sandstrom & 
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Hällsten 2008). Another problem is the assessment of interdisciplinary research and 
research proposals. Laudel et al. (2006), for example, suggested that interdisciplinary 
research receives lower grades in peer review processes. 
Peer review comes in a variety of formats, and often it is actually more like a committee 
review (Langfeldt 2001). In such a selection process, committee members provide peer 
assessements to a small subset of the submitted applications, but as committee 
members they advise or decide about all applications. Strategic behavior may then 
prevail; committee members often reach compromises so that each member warrants 
funding for one’s favorite proposals (Langfeldt 2004).  
The critique of peer review has resulted in a variety of proposals to change the 
procedures (Frolich 2003; British Academy 2007). However, a number of studies 
suggest that peer review works quite well. For example, Bornmann & Daniel (2006a, b) 
studied the selection of grant applicants extensively, using the data of a well-known 
and prestigious funding organization. The criteria used for these assessments were 
reliability, validity, and justice. In these studies, the conclusion was that despite a 
percentage of Type I and Type II errors, peer review works well on average.  
Criticism of peer review has resulted in proposals to use bibliometric quality indicators 
as a more objective alternative (Irvine & Martin, 1983). In the UK, the recent changes in 
the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) also point in this direction. In 2008, the RAE 
will be accompanied experimentally with a bibliometric evaluation in certain fields 
(Barker 2007; Oppenheim 2008). This has been criticized, mainly because bibliometric 
indicators are considered less applicable in some fields than in others, and because 
existing bibliographic databases are incomplete and biased, e.g., towards publications 
in English. Furthermore, citation patterns are different in different (sub)disciplines, and, 
therefore, bibliometrics indicators are difficult to compare across research fields 
(Leydesdorff, 2008).  
At national and international levels, efforts are currently under way to shape the 
humanities and social sciences so as to enable bibliometric assessment in the future, 
for example, by defining lists of international top journals for the respective research 
specialties.4 Another criticism, however, is that bibliometric statistics are hardly 
                                                 
4 Interestingly, the editors of many journals in science and technology studies and in the history 
of science have objected strongly this development in an editorial recently published in these 
journals (Andersen et al., 2009).  
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applicable at the level of individual researchers or applications, and above all, that the 
meaning of the indicators is still unclear. Do citations indicate quality or visibility? 
Furthermore, perverse effects are signaled: researchers would no longer focus on 
interesting research, but on adapting to the evaluation criteria (Wessely 1998; ESF 
2006; Lawrence 2007; Adler et al 2008).  
While reviewing both the academic debate and the policy debate, we have found that 
there is not much agreement on how to organize the evaluation process. Results point 
in different directions with respect to both peer review and evaluations based on 
bibliometric assessments. In the policy debate, policy and managerial actors tend to 
prefer objective (bibliometric) indicators, whereas representatives of research 
communities emphasize that peer review may not be perfect, but remains the best 
available method (Wessely 1998). Opinions seem more to reflect positions than the 
processes under study. 
 
2. The case 
MaGW-NWO is the research council for the social and behavioral sciences in the 
Netherlands. It covers all social and behavioral disciplines: economics, management, 
psychology & pedagogy, political science & public administration, sociology, 
anthropology, communication studies, geography, demography, and law. The Council 
distributes research funds among researchers, institutes, and infrastructures, and 
increasingly plays a leading role in these domains in agenda setting, coordination, and 
network formation. 
The Council has a budget of approximately 36 M€/year, of which 8 M€ is used for an 
open competition, 10 M€ for career grants, and 13 M€ for thematic research grants. In 
this study we assess the outcomes of the open competition and the career grants; 
these make up together about half of the Council’s budget. The thematic grants were 
excluded since one can expect factors other than scientific excellence to play a role in 
this funding, such as the expected societal benefits of the research. 
We were given access to applications for the years 2003, 2004, and 2005. Our dataset 
consists of 1178 applications, distributed unevenly over the disciplines: from 347 in 
psychology, 274 in economics, and 206 in law to 30 in communication studies, 28 in 
anthropology, and 9 in demography. Of these applications, 275 were accepted for 
funding. The applications cover four different funding programs: the open competition 
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(629, of which 155 were granted), the young researchers’ career program (“Veni”: 428, 
of which 65 were granted), a second career development program (“Vidi”: 100, of which 
43 were granted) and finally the top career program (“Vici”: 29 applications, of which 12 
were granted).   
The review process is organized differently in the various programs. In the open 
competition, proposals are reviewed by peers, and the researchers are given an 
opportunity to react to their comments. The proposal with a CV, the reviews, and the 
reply are input for the Council that makes the decision. In case of the career grants, the 
procedures vary. In the program for young researchers’ grants, a pre-selection process 
takes place within a committee before the proposals are sent out for review. After the 
review, a selection of researchers is invited to present their proposals to the committee. 
The decision of the Council is based on the review scores, the proposal, the CV of the 
researcher, and this presentation.  
 
3. The model 
We use a model (Figure 1) to explain the success of a grant application in terms of the 
factors introduced above. In this schematic representation of the relevant processes, 
the decision about research funding is considered to be based on the quality of (1) the 
researcher involved, (2) the proposal, and (3) the network of the applicant. The quality 
of the proposal is operationalized as the judgments of peers, which are based on a 
review process. The past performance of the applicant (4) and his/her network (5) may 
play a role in this assessment.5   
Various studies have indicated the existence of ‘sexism and nepotism in science’ (e.g., 
Wenneras & Wold, 1998). Furthermore, the interests of the actors involved and other 
social factors should be taken into account. Several variables can be considered in this 
context, such as the gender of the applicants, or network relations between applicants, 
reviewers, and decision makers which may partly be based on shared disciplinary and 
university affiliations. Each of these factors may influence the decisions of the research 
council (6), but also the comments of the referees (7). 
The focus of this study is on the effects of past performance (arrow 1 in Figure 1), the 
referee’s assessments (arrow 2), and the quality of the applicant’s network (arrow 3) on 
                                                 
5 In case of the young researchers program, expected future performance may enter as a 
consideration more importantly than past performance.  
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the funding decision. Additionally, we test the extent to which the review outcome is 
related to past performance (arrow 4) and the applicants’ network (arrow 5). Finally, we 
analyze how contextual factors play a role (arrows 6 and 7), as this may inform us 
about the quality or bias of the procedures of the Council. We did not measure the 
effect of grant allocations on post-performance, as this would be too early in reference 
to the data that were used in this study (that is, applications to the research Council in 
2003, 2004 and 2005). 
 
FIGURE 1: Schematic representation of the model. 
 
4. Data and methods 
The applications are our units of analysis. The dependent variable is the decision about 
the application, and this variable has three values: ‘fundable’ and funded (A); ‘fundable’ 
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but not funded (A-); and ‘non-fundable’ applications (B). The applications vary in a 
number of respects.  
- Firstly, we obtained data covering three years: 2003, 2004, and 2005. On some 
occasions, it will be relevant to compare the results across years.  
- Secondly, the data cover four different instruments. The Research Council uses a 
variety of funding instruments, and the data accordingly distinguish between 
personal grants for researchers in three different phases of their careers and the 
open competition (OC).6 The Council emphasized that the role of past performance 
may differ per instrument; hence there is also a need to distinguish among the 
instruments. In particular, the personal grants for young researchers (the so called 
VENI awards) may not be based on past performance, since these researchers are 
probably too young to have a strong track record. We therefore analyzed the data 
for the four instruments separately. 
- Thirdly, the applications cover different disciplines, and past performance indicators 
(e.g., citation behavior and the orientation on SoSCI journals) can be expected to 
differ across disciplines and specialties. Our analysis starts at the aggregate level 
of the social and behavioral sciences as a whole, but we also test the model at the 
level of the disciplines and sub-disciplines. 
Our first independent variable is past performance. Since this is a case study about a 
social science research council, data from the Social Science Citation Index (SoSCI) 
could be used as a representation of past performance of the relevant communities.  
For this measurement, we agreed with the Council to use the number of publications 
and citations received by both applicants and non-applicants (with a Dutch address) in 
the three year period prior to their application. We agreed with the Research Council to 
use this three-years period because the application form provides little space for the 
applicant to list his/her (recent) publications. In other words, success in 2003 is related 
to the publication data of 2001-2003 and the citations to these publications, success in 
2004 to performance data of 2002-2004, and success in 2005 to performance data of 
2003-2005.7  
The number of publications in a certain year is defined in terms of publication years as 
indicated on the publications. (These dates are sometimes delayed when compared 
                                                 
6 The thematic programs were not included in this study. Nevertheless, it would be useful to 
analyze these too, as the goals of the thematic programs are different and include criteria such 
as the possible societal outcomes of the research. These criteria are more opaque than the 
ones we analyzed in this study. 
7 The performance of the co-applicants was measured in the same way.  
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with calendar years.) The “times cited” are measured on February 9, 2007. All articles, 
reviews, notes, and letters with a Dutch address are included. While the applications to 
MaGW provide our units of analysis, a single researcher who applies more than once 
in a single year, may score differently on the grants received, but not on these 
performance indicators. If a researcher applies in different years, however, past 
performance can be expected to vary among years.  
This citation window is disputed within the social sciences (SWR-RGW 2005), but we 
were able to agree upon this procedure with the Research Council. A few issues are 
relevant to this decision:  
- First, in some of the social sciences, books and not journals are the main 
publication outlets. We did not take these other publication formats into account, 
and for several fields (such as law) this is a serious disadvantage. For these fields, 
the current analysis should be interpreted with even more care (Nederhof 2006).8 
- Second, the journals indexed in the SoSCI do not cover the complete relevant 
journal space. Furthermore, the coverage of the SoSCI varies for different parts of 
the social sciences. The orientation on publishing in journals which are processed 
by the Institute of Scientific Information (ISI) for inclusion in the SoSCI also differs 
per subfield (Van den Besselaar 2007).  
- Third, even if sub-fields of the social sciences were covered equally well by the 
SoSCI, the disciplines and specialties are not homogenous in terms of publication 
and citation patterns.  
Despite these shortcomings, the operationalization of quality in terms of citations and 
publications in ISI-indexed journals is increasingly institutionalized in Dutch universities; 
for example, in the case of the evaluation of graduate schools. Although many 
researchers have doubts about the validity of these indicators, the funding and 
evaluation procedures increasingly use them. Given these institutional incentives, 
researchers themselves increasingly try to publish in the ‘top journals’ as defined by 
impact factors.  
The last name and the first initial were used to match the ISI data and the application 
data. This generates some error. For example, one of Van den Besselaar’s  articles is 
listed in the ISI-database as authored by “Van den BesselaarA”, and L. Leydesdorff 
                                                 
8As all these disciplines are evaluated in the same procedure by the Council, we start by 
including all disciplines. We will of course check if this influences the outcomes of our analysis, 
and repeat the analyses below also for the disciplines separately. 
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also appeared as “T Leydesdorff” in the database. These errors were not (manually) 
corrected. Our results should therefore be read as statistics with margins of error.  
Our second independent variable is the quality of the proposal in the opinion of the 
referees. The data provided by the Research Council included the scores of the 
referees. However, the different instruments use a different classification system, and 
the classification schemes have changed slightly over the years. Two of the three 
scales were five-point scales, the other a three-point scale. We translated these 
different measures into a single five-point scale, using the scheme shown in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1: Coding of the referees’ scores9 
Coding OC OC / VI VI* 
1  A Excellent Continue 
2   Very Good Doubt/continue 
3  B Good Doubt 
4   Fair Doubt/stop 
5  C Poor Stop 
OC: open competition;   
VI: ‘vernieuwingsimpuls’ (three ‘career grant’ programs) 
VI*: used in the pre-selection phase of the ‘vernieuwingsimpuls’  
 
The third independent variable is the quality of the network of the applicant. This 
variable is operationalized as the quality of the co-applicants in terms of past 
performance in the same way as the past performance of the applicants—that is, using 
numbers of publications and citations. We used two different operationalizations to 
calculate indicators for the quality of the network:  
 Average network quality: average number of publications by the applicant and co-
applicants, and average number of citations received by the applicant and co-
applicants; 
 Maximal network quality: the number of publications of the most productive 
applicant or co-applicant, and the number of citations received by the most highly 
cited applicant or co-applicant. 
Only the applications for the open competition can be included in this last analysis, as 
career programs do not involve co-applicants. One may argue that other dimensions of 
an applicant’s network could also be considered, such as the status of the applicant’s 
                                                 
9  It may seems strange to put “very good” and “doubt/continue” into one category? However, 
this reflects the Dutch research evaluation context. A score of 3 (good) is considered as low 
(doubtful quality), and one is generally unsatisfied with a score lower than 4.5 (in between very 
good and excellent) 
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PhD supervisor, the co-author network of the applicant, etc. In our opinion, these are 
interesting topics for further research.  
Several methods were used for the analysis. We compare the group of successful with 
the group of unsuccessful applications using ANOVA: do these two groups differ 
significantly in terms of the independent variables? Using correlation analysis, we 
relate the past performance of the applicants and the review scores of the applications 
(the independent variables) with the amount of funding received. Using discriminant 
analysis, we test whether the independent variables could be used to ‘predict’ whether 
an application would be successful or not. In the first and the last analysis, the amount 
of the funding is not taken into account, but only the dichotomous variable of whether 
an application is funded or not. 
 
TABLE 2: Variables of this study; the units of analysis are 1186 applications. 
Pub Number of publications by the applicant (three years before the application) 
Cit Number of citations to these publications at 7 February 2007 
Pub2 Average number of publications by applicant and the co-applicants  
Cit2 Average number of citations to the publications of the (co-)applicants, at 7 Feb. 2007 
Pub3 Number of publications by the most productive of the applicant and the co-applicants  
Cit3 Number of citations to the publications of the most cited of the (co-)applicants, at 7 Feb. 2007 
Sex Gender  of  main applicant 
Uni University of main applicant 
Disc Discipline of application 
Instr funding instruments (three types of personal grants and open competition) 
Ref Average of the referee’s reports 
Dec ‘Fundability’: assessment by research Council  
Euro ‘Funding’: grants received from the research Council in euros . 
 
 
5. Research questions  
We posed the following questions in this study: 
1. Are the A (funded), A- (fundable, unfunded), and B (unfunded) applicants different 
in terms of their past performance and average referee scores?  
2. Do past performance and the referee scores (of these three groups) correlate with 
the funding received? 
3. Can one predict the success of applicants from their past performance and/or the 
referee scores? 
After answering these questions, we will analyze the influence of some mediating 
variables, such as differences in subfields, funding instruments, the quality of the co-
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applicants, and the gender of the main applicants. More specifically, we discuss the 
following two issues: 
4. Are there differences between disciplines: are the results different in e.g., law, 
economics, psychology, and the other disciplines under study here? Does the 
discipline influence the relations between the performance variables and the 
probability of success?  
5. And what about gender differences? 
 
6. Peer review, performance, and successful applications 
ANOVA (analysis of variance) can be used to test whether grant recipients score more 
highly in terms of numbers of publications, citations, and referee scores than the 
researchers who did not get their proposals accepted for funding. Table 3 provides the 
results of the ANOVA. The successful applicants publish significantly more than the 
failed applicants (4.5 versus 2.7 publications), and are significantly more cited (36.0 
versus 15.6 citations). Finally, the referees are significantly more positive about the 
funded applications than the non-funded ones. The difference is one point on a five-
point scale. The successful applications score 1.6 (‘very good/excellent’) and the non-
funded applications score on average 2.7 (slightly better than ‘good’). 
 
TABLE 3: Publications and citations by success (2003-2005) 
 N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean Minimum 
Maximu
m 
          
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound     
Citations A 275 36.03 70.704 4.264 27.64 44.43 0 593 
  A- / B 911 15.61 45.295 1.501 12.67 18.56 0 621 
  Total 1186 20.35 52.969 1.538 17.33 23.36 0 621 
Publications A 275 4.45 5.988 .361 3.74 5.16 0 43 
  A- / B 911 2.71 4.915 .163 2.39 3.03 0 62 
 Total 1186 3.11 5.233 .152 2.81 3.41 0 62 
Referee  A 274 1.59 0.634 .036 1.52 1.66 1.00 3.67 
 A-/ B 904 2.68 1.045 .035 2.61 2.75 1.00 5.00 
  Total 1183 2.43 1.064 .031 2.36 2.49 1.00 5.00 
 
  Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Citations Between Groups 88091.424 1 88091.424 32.224 .000 
  Within Groups 3236713.147 1184 2733.710     
  Total 3324804.571 1185      
Publications Between Groups 638.992 1 638.992 23.785 .000 
  Within Groups 31808.317 1184 26.865     
  Total 1332.180 1177      
Referee  Between Groups 247.143 1 247.143 267.862 .000 
  Within Groups 1085.037 1176 .923     
  Total 1332.180 1177      
A: funded; A-: fundable, not funded; B: not-fundable 
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We also grouped the applications differently: ‘fundable applications’ (A and A-) versus 
‘non-fundable applications’ (B). Again, the ‘fundable’ applications score significantly 
better on all variables than the ‘non-fundable’ ones. The differences are smaller (but 
still statistically significant) than when comparing the funded (A) and the non-funded (A- 
and B) applications. When comparing A with A-, again the A applications score 
significantly higher than the A-.  
 
The problem of skewed distributions 
Most statistical techniques used assume normal distributions in the data, although, for 
example, discriminant analysis is robustly against violation of this assumption. To help 
interpret the statistical results correctly, we present graphs of the distribution of 
publications as an example (Figure 2). The figure shows on the left side the funded 
applications and on the right side the rejected ones. As this figure shows, the data are 
skewly distributed. The rejected ones include a long tail on the right side.  
Figure 2 suggests that in the top segments of the distributions the number of 
publications per applicant is not very different between the two (successful and 
unsuccessful) groups. Furthermore, one can see that the (short) tail of the successful 
group contains applicants with low scores. Similar patterns can be shown for the 
distribution of the citations and referee scores. In any case, if there are differences 
between the two groups (of awarded and rejected applicants), these differences are not 
so large that one can identify them from visual inspection of the graphs. 
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FIGURE 2: Distribution of publications; successful applicants (left) and unsuccessful (right)  
(left axis: number of publications; number of citations/10) 
 
 
FIGURE 3: Superposition of the distribution of publications of successful and best unsuccessful 
applicants (left axis: number of publications; number of citations/100) 
 
In order to obtain a more detailed overview, we plotted the distributions of publications 
of the 275 successful applicants and the top performing 275 non-successful applicants 
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in a single graph (Figure 3).10 The results are interesting because they show that the 
best scoring unsuccessful applicants score higher in terms of past performance than 
the successful applicants. In other words, the long tail of the lower performing 
applicants causes the differences in the averages between the two groups. We can 
conclude therefore that the skewed distributions in the data may indeed heavily 
influence the statistical results above.  
When we restrict the ANOVA to the top 275 unsuccessful applicants and 275 
successful applicants the results change radically.11 As already suggested by Figure 3, 
unsuccessful applicants achieve a significantly higher score on the past performance 
indicator (Table 4). For the refereeing results, the initial difference disappears: in this 
smaller set no significant difference remains between the two groups. 
 
 
TABLE 4: Publications and citations by success—top 550 only* (2003-2005) 
  N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean Min Max 
          
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound     
pub A 275 4.44 5.992 .361 3.73 5.15 0 43 
  A-/B* 277 6.92 7.068 .425 6.08 7.75 0 62 
  Total 552 5.68 6.664 .284 5.13 6.24 0 62 
cit A 275 36.03 70.708 4.264 27.63 44.42 0 593 
  A-/B* 277 48.04 72.338 4.346 39.48 56.59 0 621 
  Total 552 42.05 71.718 3.053 36.06 48.05 0 621 
ref A 276 1.62 .749 .045 1.53 1.71 1 9 
 A-/B* 271 1.64 .492 .0300 1.58 1.70 1 3 
 Total 547 1.63 .634 .0277 1.58 1.68 1 9 
 
  Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
pub Between Groups 846.670 1 846.670 19.711 .000 
  Within Groups 23624.850 550 42.954     
  Total 24471.520 551      
cit Between Groups 19907.016 1 19907.016 3.891 .049 
  Within Groups 2814158.461 550 5116.652     
  Total 2834065.476 551      
ref Between Groups .038 1 .038 .094 .759 
  Within Groups 219.418 545 .403     
  Total 219.455 546      
A: funded; A-:fundable, not funded; B: not-fundable 
*: stratified (by funding instrument) sample of best scoring unsuccessful applicants. “Best” is defined in two 
ways (past performance and referee score). This results in different groups. 
With these results, question one of this study can be answered: on average, the funded 
applicants have a better past performance than the non-funded applicants, the 
                                                 
10 Top performing is based on citations received and (secondly) on publications. Of these about 
50% are considered as fundable by the Council, and the other 50% as non-fundable. 
11 The distribution over the four instruments (OC: 154 and 159; Veni: 65 and 83; Vidi: 43 and 
21, Vici: 12 and 12) is not equal in the two groups of successful and unsuccessful applicants. 
Correction for this – by using a stratified sample – does not change the results. 
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fundable applicants have a better past performance than the non-fundable, and the 
funded applicants have a better past performance than the fundable-non-funded. 
However, this comparison is based on averaging over highly skewed distributions. The 
275 non-funded applicants with the highest scores had significantly higher scores on 
past performance indicators than the 275 funded applicants. This suggests firstly that 
the selection was not based on past performance (as it was defined in this study), and 
secondly that the reservoir of potential recipients is much larger than the group that 
was awarded (Melin and Danell 2006).  
Similarly, the funded applicants have on average a better score in the referee reports 
than the non-funded applicants, the fundable applicants have on average a better 
referee’s score than the non-fundable, and the funded applicants have on average a 
better referee’s score than the fundable-non-funded (A-). But the 275 unsuccessful 
applicants with the highest referee scores perform at the same level as the successful 
applicants. 
In summary, our results suggest that the system is successful in identifying and 
discarding the tail of the distribution according to the Mertonian norms of rewarding 
merit, but not successful in selecting among the applications by applicants who meet 
these norms.  
 
7. Is one able to predict success from past performance? 
Let us further analyze the relations between past performance, referee scores, and 
success in getting an application funded. The application is again the unit of analysis. 
Consequently, if researchers file more than one project, these projects are treated as 
two different cases. Because the data used are relatively skewed (publications, 
citations), an ordinal measure of association such as Spearman’s rho is used.12  
As Table 5 shows, past performance measures—numbers of citations received and 
numbers of publications—correlate strongly (ρ = 0.92). These performance indicators 
correlate positively with the amount of funding received, but this correlation is low (ρ < 
0.20). There is also a low but significant correlation between referee’s judgments and 
the past performance indicators (ρ ≈ 0.20). Referee reports also correlate moderately 
with the funding received, but higher do than the past performance indicators (ρ = 
                                                 
12 The referees’ judgments are less skewed, and the mean (2.42) and median (2.17) differ only 
slightly.  
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0.46). (The negative sign of these correlations in Table 5 can be read as positive; the 
inversion of the sign is caused by the scale used for measuring the referee’s 
judgments, which rank applicants from one for ‘excellent’ to five for ‘poor’.)  
 
TABLE 5: Success by past performance and peer review 
  Cit referee  euro 
Publications Spearman’s rho .923 -.205 .160
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000
  N 1186 1178 1186
Citations Spearman’s rho  -.214 .185
    Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000
    N  1178 1186
Referee  Spearman’s rho   -.455
    Sig. (2-tailed)   .000
    N   1178
 
 
Discriminant Analysis (DA) can be used to distinguish group membership (a nominal 
variable), such as successful and unsuccessful applications, from interval variables, 
such as the numbers of publications and citations, and the referee scores. We 
conducted several DAs, and all the analyses resulted in a significant model.  
In the first DA we used ‘publications’ and ‘citations’ as independent variables. The 
model correctly classifies about 35% of the successful applications, and about 85% of 
the unsuccessful. This does not change in the stepwise model, which by the way 
removed ‘publications’ as a relevant predictor from the analysis. It shows that although 
successful and unsuccessful applications differ in terms of the numbers of publications 
by the applicants, these differences do not differentiate between the two classes. In 
other words, at this level of all instruments and all sub-disciplines, past performance 
(as defined in this specific way) is only weakly related to success. 
We also used DA with ‘publications,’ ‘citations,’ and ‘referee scores.’ This improved the 
classifications considerably. In this case, the percentage of correctly classified 
successful applications is 85%, and the percentage of correctly classified unsuccessful 
applications is 61% (Table 6). A stepwise procedure does not change the result — but 
the ‘publications’ variable is again removed. 
In summary, the reports of the referees contribute considerably to the correctly 
predicted classification. This accords with the results of the correlation analysis which 
showed above that the relation between ‘funding received’ and the ‘referee’s scores’ is 
moderately high at 0.46. Nevertheless, a large part of the variance remains 
unexplained. In other words, the Council takes considerable responsibility for making 
its own funding decisions: it accepts applications with low referee scores, and it 
regularly rejects applications that received high appreciation from the reviewers. 
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TABLE 6: Classification of applications from pub, cit, and ref * 
 
A versus 
A- / B  
Predicted Group  
Membership Total 
    A A- or B   
Original Count A 231 43 274
    A- or B 354 550 904
  % A 84.3 15.7 100.0
    A- or B 39.2 60.8 100.0
a  66.3% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
* Stepwise: cit and ref remain in the analysis 
 
 
The top 550 (2 x 275) again 
As in the previous analysis, the long tails of the unsuccessful group may heavily 
influence the outcome of the analysis. Therefore, we repeated the analysis including 
only the top segment of the unsuccessful applicants (stratified sample in terms of 
funding instruments). The results are striking: the correlations between past 
performance indicators and funding become negative, and these correlations are 
stronger than in the case of the whole sample (Table 7).  
 
TABLE 7. Success by past performance* 
  Cit Euro 
Pub Spearman's rho  .833 -.256
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000
  N 552 552
Cit Spearman's rho  -.262
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000
  N 552
*    Stratified (by funding instrument) sample of best scoring unsuccessful applicants 
 
We applied the same stratification to the referees’ scores. As Table 8 shows, the 
correlation between referee scores and awarded grants has disappeared—although it 
was rather large in the whole dataset.13 In this case, none of the three independent 
variables explains success in obtaining funding. 
 
                                                 
13 Since the definition of the unsuccessful applications with the highest scores is different from 
the one used in Table 7, correlations between ‘publications,’ ‘citations,’ and ‘euro’ differ between 
Tables 7 and 8. 
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TABLE 8. Success by review score and past performance* 
  Cit Euro Referee 
Pub Spearman's rho .917 .086 -.048
  Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .155 .266
  N 547 276 547
Cit Spearman's rho .055 .001
  Sig. (2-tailed) . .359 .988
  N 276 547
Euro Spearman's rho -.004
  Sig. (2-tailed) .950
  N 276
*    Stratified (by funding instrument) sample of best scoring unsuccessful applicants 
 
The discriminant analysis works differently in this case than in the case of the whole 
sample: a larger number of the successful applications are now correctly classified. 
However, the number of correctly classified unsuccessful applications has decreased 
(Table 9). More importantly, the percentage of correctly classified cases is not much 
higher than 50%. This means that the prediction using the performance indicators as 
independent variables in the DA barely improves on a random classification.  
 
TABLE 9. Classification of applications from pub en cit (stepwise*) 
  decision 
Predicted Group 
Membership Total 
    1 2   
Original Count A 192 83 275
    A- or B 148 129 277
  % A 69.8 30.2 100.0
    A- of B 53.4 46.6 100.0
a  58.2% of original grouped cases correctly classified. 
A = funded; A- = fundable, not funded; B = not funded 
 
DA applied to the set including the unsuccessful applications with the best referee 
scores did not work. In this model, all variables were excluded from the discriminant 
analysis, indicating that publications, citations, and referee scores cannot be used to 
predict success within this sub-population. 
We are now able to answer the second and the third research questions of this study: 
do past performance and success correlate? And, can one predict the success of 
applicants from their publication and citation scores? 
- The correlation analysis shows a low correlation between the scientometric 
indicators of past performance and the amount of funding received. The 
correlations between past performance and referee scores are also low. 
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- If one wants to predict success and failure (not taking into account the amount of 
money received), the number of citations can be used statistically to predict group 
membership. However, only a low percentage of the successful cases are correctly 
classified.  
- By including the referee scores, the percentage of correct predictions increases 
considerably.  
- When comparing the group of successful and top 275 unsuccessful applicants, all 
relationships disappear, and in this case, we find a negative correlation between 
past performance and the amount of funding received. Between referee judgment 
and funding, the correlation disappears. 
- We repeated the analysis at the discipline level, with the same results as for the 
whole set. Using ANOVA, in each of the disciplines the referee scores, the number 
of publications, and the citations received do not differ significantly between the 
successful and the best unsuccessful applicants. 
Some additional tests were done:  
- We repeated the analysis for the four different funding instruments, as the criteria 
and the selection procedures are different. The relations between the variables 
became even lower than for the set as a whole, with the exception of the VICI 
program. However, the N is very small in this case.   
- We also studied the effect of the past performance of the co-applicants. The 
successful applicants have on average co-applicants with a higher past 
performance than the unsuccessful ones. Correlation between the network 
indicators and the outcomes of the review process are low, but higher than the 
correlation between the past performance of the main applicant and the results of 
the review process. The same holds for the correlation between these network 
indicators and the amount of funding.14 We therefore may conclude that the quality 
of the co-applicants does positively influence the success of an application, but this 
effect is not strong. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Including the network indicators in the discriminant analysis hardly improves the classification 
results. 
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8. Disciplinary differences? 
As already stated, the variable ‘past performance’ may have a rather different meaning 
in the various fields. The relevant question then is whether or not the results obtained 
for the social sciences as a whole can be reproduced at the level of the disaggregated 
disciplines. Publication and citation behaviors vary among disciplines and fields.  
Table 10 illustrates this difference for sociology and psychology journals as an 
example. Psychology journals (as defined by the ISI subject categories) have on 
average higher impact factors, and this indicates that psychologists have longer 
reference lists per paper than sociologists. Another reason could be that compared with 
psychologists, sociologists cite other document types (books, book chapters etc.) more 
frequently than journal articles. Furthermore, what counts as a top journal in 
psychology is different from what would count as a top journal in sociology, if one takes 
the impact factor of the journal (IF) as a criterion. The top 10% starts in sociology with 
an IF of 1.382, and in psychology with an IF of 3.458. The maximum value of the IF of 
sociology is even below this cutoff value with only 3.262.  
 
TABLE 10: Differences in citation behavior between fields 
 mean CoV* Median max top 10% skewness N 
All SoSCI 0.982 1.041 0.697 12.642 IF >2.013 3.869 1745 
Psychology 1.287 1.386 0.650 9.780 IF >3.458 3.114 101 
Sociology 0.683 0.879 0.460 3.262 IF >1.382 1.982 94 
*: coefficient of variance = standard deviation divided by mean; IF = Impact Factor 
 
These differences at the disciplinary level are reflected in the scores on the variables 
used in this study. Indeed, the averages of the variables show a large variation among 
the disciplines (Table 11). 
 
TABLE 11: Averages in the sample by discipline 
     Mean     
 N Pub# cit Pub2 Cit2 Pub3 Cit3 ref K€ 
Anthropology 28 1.4 5.3 1.0 3.8 1.4 5.3 2.4 234 
Communication 30 3.7 16.1 2.8 11.4 4.1 18.7 2.6 149 
Demography 9 2.3 7.0 3.1 11.8 4.6 20.2 2.4 288 
Economics** 274 2.4 8.5 2.4 8.8 3.0 11.4 2.6 235 
Education 79 2.8 19.7 2.9 20.1 3.3 21.9 2.8 180 
Geography 40 2.5 12.0 2.6 12.4 2.9 13.4 2.2 340 
Law 206 0.5 2.0 0.6 2.4 1.0 3.8 2.3 187 
Political sci*** 56 1.2 3.8 1.2 4.0 1.6 5.9 2.5 209 
Psychology* 347 5.8 48.5 5.9 49.7 7.8 65.3 2.2 249 
Sociology 115 2.9 13.3 3.4 17.3 4.9 26.2 2.5 169 
Total 1184 3.1 20.3 3.2 21.1 4.2 27.9 2.4 226 
# See table 1 for the variable names 
* Incl. pedagogy; ** Incl. management; *** Incl. public policy 
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To find out if these differences between disciplines influence the findings of the 
previous sections, we repeated the analysis for the different disciplines separately. 
Table 12 shows the correlations between past performance, referee results, and the 
amount of funding for the disciplines individually. We omit the disciplines with N<50.  
On average, the indicators work better at the discipline level, as the correlations 
between past performance and referee scores are somewhat higher than at the 
aggregated level. The same holds for the correlation between past performance and 
funding received. However, the correlations are still not high. The relation between the 
review outcome and the received funding remains unchanged. However, a few cases 
deviate from these patterns.  
- In law, the bibliometric indicators did not correlate at all with the review results and 
with the received funding. This is in line with the general opinion that research in 
the field of law is not oriented towards publication in international journals, but has 
other types of (mainly nationally oriented) output;  
- In the case of political science, the bibliometric indicators did not correlate with the 
amount of funding; 
- In the case of communication studies, the bibliometric indicators did not correlate 
with the referees’ evaluations; 
- In the case of demography, negative correlations were found, but these were not 
significant due to the low numbers (N = 9).  
 
TABLE 12: Relations (Spearman’s rho) between past performance,  
referee score and success by discipline 
 PP~Rev PP~Euro Rev~Euro N
All 0.21 0.17 0.46 1181
Average 0.28 0.28 0.44 
Psychology* 0.27 0.19 0.49 345
Economics** 0.33 0.15 0.42 274
Law - - 0.43 206
Sociology 0.17 - 0.45 114
Education 0.32 0.10 0.43 79
Political science*** 0.27 - - 56
Geography 0.36 0.44 0.37 40
Communication - 0.28 0.50 30
Anthropology 0.27 0.50 0.45 28
Demography - - - 9
PP = past performance (average of variables pub and cit) 
Netw = quality of the network (average of variables pub3 and cit3) 
Rev = average of the referee scores (variable ref) 
Euro = amount of money received (variable euro) 
* Incl. pedagogy; ** Incl. management; *** incl. Incl. public policy 
 
 
When we disaggregated to an even lower level, the analysis did not further improve. 
For example, we calculated the correlations between past performance, referee scores, 
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and the success of the applications for the four sub-disciplines of psychology, as 
distinguished by the Research Council. Some of the correlation are higher than for 
psychology on average; others are very low and/or not significant (Table 13).  
 
TABLE 13: Relations between past performance, referee score and success by sub-discipline of psychology                    
(Spearman’s rho) PP~Rev PP~€ Rev~€ N
All 0.21 0.17 0.46 1181
Psychology (incl. pedagogy) 0.27 0.19 0.49 345
Clinical /biological /medical psychology 0.32  0.45 85
Developmental psychology & pedagogy 0.25 0.35 0.49 68
Cognitive and biological psychology 0.28  0.49 109
Social, work and organizational psychology; psychometrics 0.24 0.29 0.58 83
 
Finally, we used discriminant analysis at the level of disciplines. If we use only the past 
performance indicators in the analysis, the results at the disciplinary level are similar to 
those for the whole set, with the exception of law (83% correct positives, 15% correct 
negatives). But we have already seen that the indicators do not seem to work in the 
case of law (Table 12). Interestingly, if we use all the variables in a stepwise analysis, 
only the peer review variable is retained, and the past performance indicators are 
removed from the analysis.  
We now can answer question 4: the indicators work slightly better at the level of 
disciplines, but this does not change the results obtained in the previous sections for 
the total set. In other words, the decisions at the disciplinary level are somewhat 
stronger related to past performance. The effects of the referee reports, however, did 
not change. 
 
9.  Contextual factors: discipline and gender  
Does the discipline matter if one wants to obtain funding for a proposal? Table 14 
shows two interesting patterns. First, the accepted applications are unevenly 
distributed over the disciplines. Three disciplines have a large share of all accepted 
proposals: psychology and pedagogy (43%), economics (17%), and law (14%). The 
remainder is only 26%. Furthermore, the acceptance rates differ considerably between 
the sub-disciplines, from 10% in political science to 32% in psychology.  
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TABLE 14: Accepted applications by subfield (OC and VI) 
 
Number of 
 applications 
Applications 
By field Accepted 
Rejection 
 Rate 
Accepted  
by field 
 
Professors* 
Anthropology 30 2.4 9 70.0 3.3  2.3  
Communication  31 2.4 5 83.9 1.8  1.5  
Demography 10 0.8 2 80.0 0.7  0.1  
Economics** 301 23.7 46 84.7 16.8  35.6  
Education 81 6.4 14 82.7 5.1  3.3  
Geography 47 3.7 8 83.0 2.9  3.4  
Law 219 17.2 41 81.3 15.0  28.4  
Political science***  61 4.8 6 90.2 2.2  6.0  
Psychology**** 370 29.1 119 67.8 43.4  15.0  
Sociology 121 9.5 24 80.2 8.8  4.5  
Total 1271 100% 274 78.4 100%  100%  
*   Full and associate professors by field — general universities. Source: NOD, 2004.  
**  Incl. management *** Incl. public policy  **** Incl. pedagogy 
 
Secondly, the distribution of successful applications over the disciplines reflects the 
size of the disciplines. The last column in Table 14 shows the relative sizes of the 
disciplines in the Netherlands universities, in terms of numbers of full professors and 
associate professors. The differences in size are rather large. The number of 
professors per discipline correlates highly (r = 0.80) with the number of applications, 
and moderately (r = 0.53) with the number of successful applications. In sum, 
‘redistribution’ takes place among the large disciplines. Economics and law get 
substantially less than could be expected given their size. Psychology gets more: 15% 
of the senior staff produces 29% of the applications, and 46% of the successful ones.15  
Does gender matter in getting a proposal accepted? In the dataset under study, about 
32% of all applications have a female principal investigator. The activity of men and 
women in the various fields and instruments are different, as are their success rates. 
The question of gender bias in (peer) review procedures is an important issue 
(Wenneras & Wold 1997). Empirical research shows contradictory findings, although a 
recent meta-analysis suggests that a (relatively small) gender bias exists (Bornmann et 
al., 2008b).  
Let us define gender inequality in our model as men having a better chance than 
women to get a project funded, given the same referee results and with the same past 
performance. For example, if male researchers have a better past performance, this 
may explain the higher rating by the referees and it may explain the higher success 
rate of male researchers. Table 15 shows that male and female researchers indeed do 
differ significantly in terms of publications, citations, and referee results. Male 
                                                 
15 The dominance of psychology is even stronger on the level of the individual schemes: 75% 
of the Vici grants – the most prestigious one among the four included in this study – are for 
researchers in the field of psychology. 
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researchers receive higher scores from referees. The average score of the female 
researchers is 87% of the score of male researchers. Female researchers also score 
lower on past performance indicators (about two thirds) than do male researchers. If 
we distinguish among the three groups of A, A- and B applications, the picture 
becomes a bit different: in all cases male applicants score better on the three 
predicators, but for the A and A- applications, the difference between the number of 
citations of male and female researchers is no longer significant.  
Does the selection process of the Research Council shows a gender bias? As Table 15 
shows, female researchers do not seem to be disadvantaged by the refereeing process 
since the gender differences are smaller in this dimension than in terms of past 
performance measurements. Furthermore, although successful male and female 
applicants receive about the same number of citations, the differences between the 
number of publications and the scores by the referees remain significant (at 10%). 
 
 
TABLE 15: Performance by gender 
 
Average nr of 
publications 
Average nr of 
citations 
Average 
referee score N
Male (all) 3.52 23 2.32 808  (68.1%)
Female (all) 2.24 16 2.66 378  (31.9%)
Female/male  .64 .69 .87 
Male (granted) 4.70 37 1.55 194  (70.5%)
Female A (granted)  3.84 34 1.71 81  (29.5%)
Female/male .82 .92 .91 
 
 
Finally, we compared the shares of female researchers in the 275 best reviewed 
applications, in the set of the 275 most publishing applicants, and in the set of the 275 
most cited applicants (Table 16). In all three ‘top lists’ the shares of female researchers 
are smaller than the share of women in the set of successful applicants. This result 
suggests that during the final decision-making process the Council corrects the results 
of the review process in favor of female applicants — reflecting a deliberate policy of 
the Council to stimulate women to pursue research careers.  
 
TABLE 16: Gender bias? 
 Male Female % Female 
Successful 275 applicants 194 81 29.5%
Top 275 refereed applications 211 64 23.3%
Top 275 publishing applicants 218 57 20.7%
Top 275 cited applicants 211 64 23.3%
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10.  Conclusions and discussion 
Research councils use different varieties of peer review, past performance 
measurements of applicants, and panel review methods when deciding which are the 
applicants and applications should be funded. The aim of this study was to compare in 
a specific case the peer-review based assessments of scientific quality with 
scientometric performance indicators, and to investigate the extent to which funding 
decisions are guided by the outcomes of the peer review process or past performance 
indicators. We have shown that this Council’s procedures operate well in identifying 
and discarding the tail of the distribution. However, within the top half of the distribution, 
neither the review outcomes nor past performance measures correlate positively with 
the decisions of the Council.16  
Obviously, the Council has a large autonomy in prioritizing the applications. In this 
process both external reviews and performance indicators play only an auxiliary role. 
As was shown, the referee reports — which are organized by the Council itself — are 
better predictors for obtaining grants than the indicators of past performance. However, 
the Council takes its own responsibility in the case of conflicting referee comments, or 
when its members’ assessments differ from the opinions of the referees or the 
performance indicators. The same holds true in the case of gender bias.  
The specific social mechanisms that dominate the decision-making process have to 
remain a subject for future research. Our findings suggest several directions to explore: 
- The positive effects of the quality of co-applicants on the probability of getting 
funded suggest a network analysis of applicants, reviewers, committee members, 
and Council board members. Is funding correlated to the visibility of the applicants 
within these networks? This impression is reinforced by the priority of citations 
when compared with publications in the prediction using discriminant analysis.  
- The distribution of funds over disciplines also seems to point to contextual factors 
influencing the grant allocation, especially in case of the large share of psychology;  
- The positive gender correction corresponds to explicit policies in the case we 
studied. 
                                                 
16 At the discipline level the indicators work slightly better and the correlations are higher. This 
was expected. Peer review based indicators are more adequate on a low level of aggregation. 
However going from discipline to sub-discipline did not further improve the results. 
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Further research may also address the limitations of this study. First, we studied only 
the open competition and career programs of a single research council. Extending the 
study to other funding schemes (such as mission-oriented and thematic programs) and 
to other disciplines would be useful. Secondly, we did not study post performance, as 
this was not possible with the available data. An important question is the extent to 
which researchers funded by the Research Council perform better ex post. Thirdly, the 
definition of past performance takes into account only a part of the research output. For 
example, books and book chapters were not included in our analysis, although in some 
of the disciplines they are considered to be more important than articles. Thus, we 
emphasize that the conclusions of this study are valid only for those disciplines in 
which international journals are the dominant form of output (such as economics and 
psychology). Finally, the outcomes of the study may be country specific, and therefore 
comparison with cases in other countries would be useful. 
In our opinion, other studies suggest that our results may be valid in more general 
terms. A study of some of the same funding instruments in other research fields in the 
Netherlands has shown the same differences that we found between the top and the 
tail of the distribution, without however studying differences within the top half of the 
distribution (Van Leeuwen 2007). Our hypothesis is that doing so would confirm our 
results also for fields such as the earth sciences and chemistry. Additionally, a detailed 
evaluation of the Boeringer Ingelheim Fonds by Bornmann & Daniel (2008) shows that 
even though the selected applicants are better on average than the non-selected 
applicants (as in our study), a large percentage of Type I errors (funded applicants who 
do not perform highly afterwards) and Type II errors (non-funded applicants who later 
become top researchers) were still detected. This means that here again, 
discrimination is modest at best. Our hypothesis would be that by using our approach 
of first correcting for the tails these authors might obtain results similar to ours.  
A recent study by Böhmer et al. (2008, at pp. 115 ff.) applied precisely our method to 
applicants to the prestigious Emmy-Noether programs for post-doc funding in the 
German Federal Republic. The results varied among disciplines: in chemistry and 
biology the funded applicants were more prolific than the non-funded, yet this relation 
was the opposite for medicine. In physics, there was no difference between those who 
were funded and those who were not. The researchers note that their results are 
indeed counter-intuitive. We therefore hypothesize that the relationships found in this 
paper for the social sciences may hold true for other fields as well. 
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11.  Policy implications 
Our study suggests that picking the best at the individual level is hardly possible. In the 
social process of granting proposals many processes play a role, apart from scholarly 
quality: bias, old-boys’ networks and other types of social networks, bureaucratic 
competencies, dominant paradigms, etc., all play an important role in selection 
processes. The policy implications therefore should go in the direction of improving the 
reflexivity of the procedures. The initiative taken by the Council to collaborate in this 
study may itself be an indication of this Council’s growing awareness of the many 
issues at stake.  
Given financial constraints, serious selection procedures are organized in order to 
choose the best proposals. However, criteria and indicators are never unambiguous, 
and this holds true not only for bibliometric indicators and peer review, but also for the 
(implicit) criteria used by decision makers. As a consequence, the quality of the grant 
allocation mechanism can be considered a systems level issue (Osterloh & Frey 2008). 
Instead of (fruitlessly) trying to improve procedures (and statistical indicators) for 
selecting individual projects, the main issue is to ensure that the system works properly 
despite uncertainties. The following relevant questions/ issues have emerged from our 
study: 
- Quality requires both variation and selection. Does the funding system support 
the required variation (through a variety of funding institutions)? Is the selection 
process adequate (e.g., a variety of criteria; openness to innovation)? Are roles 
assigned adequately (e.g., neutrality of referees)?  
- The discarding of the tail of the distribution can be done on the basis of more 
technocratic assessments (using bibliometrics) given the current criteria. This 
may be different if one wants to stimulate innovative research, because 
innovation is not necessarily correlated with these performance indicators; the 
latter are by their nature conservative. In other words, even if the procedure 
supports good (mainstream) research, it does not necessarily support 
innovation.  
- Within the core (top) group, one should be more aware of the nature of the 
review process as a form of external organization and the potential bias that is 
thus implied. From the perspective of organization theory, the reviewers can be 
considered as an (external) instrument of the Council to reach a decision, and 
not as an independent assessment of and decision about the quality of the 
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applications. This suggests the need for regularly evaluating a potential bias 
that creeps into the procedures, and regularly changing committees, panels, 
juries, and reviewers in order to keep the system open. The highly skewed 
distribution of grants over disciplines suggests that this may require periodic 
attention. To force the system to behave in this way, it may be useful to 
introduce competition between funding agencies. 
In sum, we have found a negative answer to the Council’s question of whether it 
selects the “best" researchers and proposals in terms of past performance and 
anonymous reviews.  At the same time, however, this counter-intuitive finding does not 
need to be considered a problem. From the perspective of science policy, the role of a 
Research Council is not only to select the best researchers, but to improve scientific 
research more generally, and to maximize the probability of scientific breakthroughs. 
Allocating funds to the researchers with currently the highest status can be considered 
only a specific (and to be evaluated) means to this end. The procedures for allocating 
funds can be discussed in terms of the effectiveness and efficiency of fulfilling this 
function at a systems level.17 In addition to being very time-consuming, the current 
selection procedures are perhaps increasingly ineffective beyond removing the tails of 
the distribution. The system generates necessarily Type I and Type II errors, and these 
may harm the research system (e.g. in terms of decisions for tenure) more than can be 
made visible from evaluating the allocation mechanism itself. 
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